Following Keen and Marchand (1997) , the paper analyses the effect of fiscal competition on the composition of public spending. There are three factors of production: mobile capital, mobile skilled workers, and immobile low skilled workers. Taxes are levied on capital and skilled workers. Each group of workers benefits from a different kind of public good. Mobility of skilled workers provides an incentive for jurisdictions to spend 'too much' on public goods benefitting the skilled and 'too little' on those benefitting low skilled workers. In the case of capital-skill complementarity, this incentive is strengthened. The paper also discusses provision of public infrastructure and mobility of unskilled labour.
Introduction
The literature on fiscal competition, starting with Oates (1972) and the classic pieces by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) , has largely focussed on the effects of capital mobility on the level of public spending. While some authors have shown that tax competition can be efficiency enhancing, most of the literature has tended to argue that tax and spending levels will be inefficiently low due to the fiscal externalities of taxing mobile tax bases (see Wilson, 1999 , for a survey).
The problem of the composition of public spending, however, has until recently been neglected. Keen and Marchand (1997) address this omission by analyzing how fiscal competition affects the composition of public spending between consumption goods and public inputs. They find that the spending mix will be tilted towards spending on public inputs.
The reason is that this kind of expenditure attracts mobile factors (namely, capital) while spending on consumption goods does not (since workers are assumed to be immobile).
Hence, in equilibrium, all jurisdictions could be better off if they coordinated on spending more on consumption and less on public inputs.
1
This paper extends the Keen-Marchand model by introducing skill heterogeneity: There are high skilled and low skilled workers, each benefitting from different publicly provided goods. For instance, the high skilled may want to visit public theatres and opera houses, while low skilled workers may benefit more from public housing projects and other progressive social programs. I assume that capital and high skilled labour are complementary and, in addition, I initially assume that high skilled workers are interregionally mobile while low skilled workers are not (see, e.g., Mauro and Spilimbergo, 1999 , for evidence).
These extensions are relevant for two reasons. First, on the empirical side, neglecting the interaction between different spending categories may blur the mechanisms by which 1 Matsumoto (2000) shows that overprovision of public inputs does not necessarily hold when labour is mobile as well.
communities try to attract mobile factors and by which they interact with neighbouring communities. Second, as far as the modelling side and its policy implications are concerned, it should be stressed that capital skill complementarity and the greater mobility of skilled than unskilled workers seem to be well documented.
2 Hence, jurisdictions may find that to attract capital, they also need to attract skilled workers, and to do so they may also use public goods which differentially benefit this group of workers. For instance, when Boeing moved its headquarters from Seattle to Chicago, tax incentives played a major role. But in order to win the bidding war against competing cities, Chicago also "played up its cultural institutions and Lake Michigan location-much was made of the fact that Boeing CEO Phil Condit is a sailor and an opera fan" (Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 2002, 112) . Likewise, Denver played its scenic beauty as an incentive. In fact, Denver "City Councilman Ed
Thomas stressed the high quality of life in Denver saying, 'I don't know if we even need to compete on financial incentives' " (Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 2002, 112) . In the end, Chicago may have won because of the best tax incentive package offered to Boeing, but the cited passages reflect the fact that the cities also stressed the role of amenities and public goods which benefit the company's workers.
Casual evidence for tax competition in its various forms abounds. Stories of tax relief for multinational companies and its wasteful effects are by now commonplace. The efforts of jurisdictions to attract firms by providing an attractive infrastructure is also well documented. However, there seems to be increasing awareness by jurisdictions that in order to attract capital, they also have to provide amenities which benefit the skilled workers needed by firms to produce efficiently.
The analysis is similar to Matsumoto (2000) , with the distinction that in his model, there is no skill heterogeneity and all workers are assumed to be mobile. In the present model, given that skilled workers are mobile, regions have an incentive to overprovide operas relative to social assistance, since the former attract mobile workers while the latter does not. Second, if there is capital-skill complementarity, this incentive is strengthened since spending on operas attracts skilled workers and capital. 3 I also analyse the distortion in spending between consumption and public inputs. This analysis is largely analogous to Keen and Marchand (1997) . Here, however, the incentive for overprovision of public inputs stems from the mobility of firms and mobile workers, while in Keen and Marchand (1997) there was no mobility, but instead an effect of public inputs on labour supply. The paper is also related to Huber (1999) who analyses factor taxation in an optimum tax model with skilled and unskilled labour, However, in his model the focus is on taxes rather than spending and labour is immobile.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3 incorporates public infrastructure into the baseline model. In section 4, the analysis is extended to incorporate mobility of low skilled labour. The last section concludes.
2 Baseline model
Uncoordinated equilibrium
The model is based on Keen and Marchand (1997) , who elaborated on Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) . There are N jurisdictions, called regions, each with independent taxing and spending power. Assume that there are three factors of production: capital k, skilled labour (or human capital), h, and unskilled labour, l. Each jurisdiction is small and treats the returns to mobile factors as given. Output is produced with a linear homogeneous production function, f (k, h, l).
Assume that capital and skilled labour are mobile while unskilled labour is immobile.
3 There is a large body of literature on CSC originating with Griliches (1969) .
Furthermore, the mass of unskilled workers in each jurisdiction is normalised to one, as is the mass of initial skilled workers (before migration) in each jurisdiction. Firms maximize profits under perfect competition. The price of output is normalised to one. Denoting partial derivatives by subscript, the production function satisfies f k , f h , f l > 0; f kk , f hh , f ll < 0. The net return to capital will be denoted by r and the net skilled wage rate by w. The unskilled wage rate is R ≡ f (k, h) − kf k − hf h . Euler's theorem implies that if capital and unskilled labour are substitutes, capital and skilled labour must be complements.
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Throughout, the assumption of capital skill complementarity (CSC) will be maintained:
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Assumption 1 Capital and skilled labour are complements in the sense that f kh > 0.
Further, at the uncoordinated equilibrium, the high skilled wage exceeds the low skilled wage:
Furthermore, as in Keen and Marchand (1997) , assume:
Assumption 2 The capital to skilled labour ratio, k/h is non-increasing in r, which is equivalent to hf hh +kf kh ≤ 0, and non-decreasing in w, which is equivalent to hf kh +kf kk ≤
0.
There are two tax instruments available: a unit tax on capital at rate t, and a tax on skilled labour at rate τ . 6 These taxes are used to finance two public goods, one benefitting skilled labour, g H , and one benefitting unskilled labour, g L . For example, one might think of theatres or opera houses which primarily benefit the upper classes versus housing assistance or social assistance to the poor.
4 Since f (·) is homogenous of degree one, hf kh = −(kf kk + lf kl ). 5 Note that the CSC hypothesis strictly speaking holds that the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labour is higher than that between capital and skilled labour. In the present analysis, however, only the absolute complementarity between capital and skilled labour matters. 6 Following the literature, I assume that a lump sum tax on unskilled labour is not feasible. Otherwise, efficiency could be achieved, see, e.g., Keen and Marchand (1997) .
Each individual is assumed to inelastically supply one unit of labour. Individuals receive income from wages and their capital endowment (k i ), which is identical for skilled and unskilled workers. Therefore, the budget constraints of a skilled and unskilled individual can be written:
The government budget constraint is
An individual with skill level j ∈ {H, L} has a quasiconcave utility function u(x j , g j ).
Factor mobility implies that each jurisdiction treats the net return to capital, r, and the utility of mobile skilled workers,ū, as given. This implies:
Equation (4) is the location equilibrium condition for capital, and (6) the corresponding condition for skilled labour. Note that since skilled labour receives utility from public goods, this condition will not in general imply that the net return to labour is equalized across jurisdictions.
Differentiation of (4), (5) and (6) gives:
where
Government is assumed to maximise a weighted social welfare function which depends on the utility of skilled and unskilled workers.
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is the weight of low skilled workers in the welfare function. Since skilled workers' utility is given (by (6)), the problem can be reformulated to maximise the welfare of unskilled workers. Using (2) and (3), the problem can be written as follows: (4), (5), and (6).
The first order conditions for interior solutions are:
Rewriting (10), (11) and (12) gives:
Equations (13) and (14) are the usual Samuelson conditions for the supply of public goods with distortionary taxes (Atkinson and Stern, 1974) : the marginal benefit of the public good is equated to the marginal cost of funds, and the MCF is equated for the two distortionary tax sources. With CSC, the standard result of underprovision of public goods holds: From Assumption 1, k τ = h t < 0 which in turn implies the MCF is above one at the second best optimum.
Equation (15) shows the effect of tax competition on the composition of public goods in the spirit of Keen and Marchand (1997) . In the first best optimum, public good provision should equate the marginal rates of substitution between public and private goods for skilled and unskilled workers. In the second best optimum, mobility of skilled labour implies that h g > 0, which leads to 'overprovision' of opera houses relative to social assistance (in the usual loose sense). Intuitively, spending on opera houses attracts mobile workers, which increases the tax base. Hence, the marginal cost of opera houses to the jurisdiction is lower than the marginal cost of social assistance. Second, CSC implies k g > 0, which further exacerbates this effect: spending on opera houses now attracts mobile workers and physical capital. Third, the unskilled wage rises with g H . As long as u L x > u H x (which holds, e.g., under additive separability of the utility function), the distributional effect of this will increase social welfare. Hence, there will be too many opera houses and too little social spending. This discussion is summarized as:
Proposition 1 With CSC, jurisdictions will provide 'too many' public goods benefitting skilled workers and 'too few' public goods benefitting unskilled workers.
Coordinated policy change
Consider a coordinated change of the spending mix for given tax rates. What is the effect on total welfare in a jurisdiction?
Proposition 2 Suppose utility is additively separable. With CSC, starting from an uncoordinated symmetric equilibrium, welfare in each jurisdiction would rise with a coordinated rebalancing of expenditures from public goods benefitting skilled labour to those benefitting unskilled labour.
Proof. Note that the allocation of capital and skilled labour and therefore also factor prices will not change, i.e., dk i = dh i = 0 and dr = dw i = 0 for all i. This implies dx j = 0 for j = H, L. Starting from the symmetric equilibrium, and using the government budget constraint (dg L = −dg H ), the effect on welfare is then given by
use having been made of (15) and the fact that h = 1 at the symmetric equilibrium. Using This result can be understood as a fiscal externality of the kind analysed in the fiscal competition literature (e.g., Wildasin, 1989) . Providing opera houses leads to an inflow of mobile workers and (because of CSC) also capital into a jurisdiction.
8 Each jurisdiction perceives this factor inflow as a benefit, but neglects the negative effect of the factor outflow on the tax bases of other jurisdictions. Spending on goods which benefit immobile factors produces no such externality, and, hence, at the uncoordinated equilibrium, each jurisdiction would benefit from rebalancing its spending towards the latter.
3 Public Infrastructure
Uncoordinated equilibrium
Along the lines of Keen and Marchand (1997) , consider now extending the previous model by introducing an infrastructure good, called p, which enters the production function, written now as f (k, h, l, p). The public input is said to be factor-augmenting (see Matsumoto, 8 This argument assumes that workers consume public goods in the jurisdiction where they reside. There is a literature which studies the 'exploitation' of central cities which provide public goods that are used by residents of the suburbs (Neenan, 1970) .
2000), which implies:
The public budget constraint now reads:
Assume that f p , f kp , f hp , f lp > 0. In addition to (7), (8), and (9), we now get:
Thus, since public capital, private capital, and skilled labour all are complements, increasing infrastructure will attract capital and labour and increase unskilled wages.
Jurisdictions maximise unskilled workers' utility subject to (16). The first order conditions for this problem are (10), (11), (12), and
Combining (19) with (13) gives
The Samuelson condition for the optimal allocation of p is f p = 1. Using (7) and (17) in (20) implies:
In general, from (21) it is not possible to sign f p −1 (see also Keen and Marchand, 1997) .
On the one hand, the RHS of (20) includes the distortionary cost of taxes, which tends to point to underprovision of infrastructure. On the other hand, to the extent that k p , h p > 0, the dead weight cost of taxing mobile factors is reduced by provision of infrastructure and underprovision does not necessarily occur at the uncoordinated equilibrium. The case originally analysed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) corresponds to τ = 0 (only capital is taxed), and h t = 0. Then (21) reduces to the following expression (see Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Keen and Marchand, 1997) :
This expression is positive as long as 1 > kf kp (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986) . 9 In this case, then, public infrastructure will be overprovided. Keen and Marchand (1997) showed that rebalancing expenditure by shifting from public inputs to public consumption goods raises welfare. Matsumoto (2000) , on the other hand, found that with mobile labour, this is not necessarily true. Since the present model has one type of mobile labour and one type of immobile labour, it is interesting to ask whether shifting expenditure from public infrastructure to consumption goods increases welfare.
Coordinated policy change
Note first that the result from subsection 2.2 still holds: shifting expenditure from operas to social assistance raises welfare with CSC. There are then several other cases of interest:
Case 1 shifting expenditure from p to g H while keeping spending on g L constant,
Case 2 shifting from p to g L while keeping spending on g H constant.
Note that, from (4) and (5), the coordinated policy change implies:
Define the utility changes for low and high skilled workers as du j 1 ≡ du j | dg H =−dp , du j 2 ≡ du j | dg L =−dp for j = H, L, and likewise for the welfare changes in case 1 and 2 as dW 1 ≡ dW | dg H =−dp , dW 2 ≡ dW | dg L =−dp . To further simplify the analysis, assume that only capital is taxed, i.e. τ = 0.
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Lemma 1 Suppose f hp + f kp < 1. Starting from the uncoordinated symmetric equilibrium, shifting expenditures from public inputs to public goods benefitting the skilled increases the utility of the high skilled and decreases the utility of the low skilled, i.e., du H 1 dp < 0 < du L 1 dp .
Proof. Differentiating du H , using (23) and k = h = 1, gives
Since in case 1, dg H = −dp,
Using (19) and (12) du H 1 dp = u H g
Since f hp + f kp < 1 and f hh + f kh ≤ 0 from Assumption 2, du H 1 dp < 0. As for low skilled utility: du
Since p is factor augmenting, f p − f hp = f kp + f lp , which is positive as long as f lp > 0, and hence, du L 1 dp > 0.
Lemma 2 Starting from the uncoordinated symmetric equilibrium,, shifting expenditures from public inputs to public goods benefitting the low skilled decreases the utility of the high skilled and increases low skilled utility, i.e., du L 2 dp < 0 < du H 2 dp .
The results generalise to the case τ > 0 as long as CSC holds.
Proof. Using (23), k = h = 1 at the symmetric equilibrium, and dg L = −dp, du
Using (19) in (28) (with τ = 0) and simplifying gives:
which is positive because of f hp , f kp > 0.
Since in case 1, the reform benefits the rich and hurts the poor, while the reverse holds in case 2, the welfare change depends on the weights in the welfare function. This is summarized in the next result.
Proposition 3 There exist θ 1 ∈ (0, 1) and θ 2 ∈ (0, 1) such that dW 1 dp < 0 for θ > θ 1 and dW 2 dp < 0 for θ < θ 2 .
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Mobility of unskilled labour
One obvious criticism of the basic model is that it assumes the unskilled to be immobile.
This assumption might be justified by appealing to empirical regularities, but it is legitimate to ask how low skilled mobility affects the model. In fact, mobility of low skilled is a central issue in the alleged 'race to the bottom' in welfare policies (e.g., Brueckner, 2000) . How then does Proposition 2 stand up when unskilled labour is mobile as well? To simplify, suppose only capital is taxed at rate t. Mobility of skilled and unskilled labour implies:
where wages are given by
Equations (31) and (32) determine the skilled and unskilled wage as functions
with
Together with (4), this system of equations determines k, h, and l as functions of t, g H , and g L . Differentiating (33), (34), and (4), using (35), gives
where concavity of f (k, h, l) implies
With mobility, maximisation of workers' utility is not a well defined objective for the individual jurisdictions anymore, so assume instead that governments maximise land rent (see, e.g., Matsumoto, 2000) :
Letting λ be the Lagrangean multiplier, the first order conditions can be written
Rewriting (40) and (41) gives u
I now introduce a different version of CSC:
Assumption 3 (i) The production function displays capital-skill complementarity in the sense that f kh > f kl for h = l.
(ii) The unskilled to skilled labour ratio, l/h is nonincreasing in w L , which is equivalent to hf hh + lf hl ≤ 0, and non-decreasing in w H , which is equivalent to hf hl + lf ll ≤ 0.
As long as k g H > k g L , which one would expect to hold under CSC, there will be relative overprovision of g H . To see whether this is indeed the case, consider now the effect of a coordinated rebalancing of expenditure from g H to g L . Since this has no effect on factor allocation, wages and rents are unaffected. Hence, the change of welfare can simply be traced to the change of workers' utility due to the change of public good supply.
Proposition 4 Suppose that utility is additively separable and f hh ≥ f ll for h = l. Then, starting from the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium, a coordinated rebalancing of expenditure from g H to g L raises welfare in every jurisdiction.
Proof. Starting from the symmetric equilibrium, the effect on welfare is given by
Using (35) 
Since
Assumption 3 implies the inequality in (45) Therefore, as long as CSC holds, overprovision of public goods benefitting skilled labour holds even when unskilled labour is mobile. The intuition is simply that with CSC, the fiscal externality implied by spending on g H is larger, at the margin, than the externality of spending on g L . Therefore, shifting expenditure from g H to g L can improve welfare.
Conclusion
The paper has examined the composition of public spending in a model of fiscal competition with heterogeneous labour. In particular, when households are mobile and capital and skilled labour complementary, jurisdictions would benefit by coordinating on spending more on public goods benefiting the low skilled and less on public goods benefiting the high skilled. This distortion of spending can also be shown to exist when both types of labour are mobile, as long as capital skill complementarity holds. There is no clear cut result, however, on the composition of spending between public consumption goods and public inputs. This is due to the fact reducing spending on infrastructure and increasing spending on consumption goods benefits one group of workers and hurts the other, depending on which good the revenue is spent. The welfare effect therefore depends on the weights of the two groups in the social welfare function.
There is some circumstantial evidence that jurisdictions compete by offering tax incentives to firms, infrastructure, but also public goods benefiting mobile skilled labour. One question would be whether one can also find hard empirical evidence for the distortion of spending under fiscal competition. Another empirical application would be to simulate welfare effects of policy coordination based on estimates of substitution elasticities between factors of production. This would allow to gauge the magnitudes of the welfare effects analysed in the paper.
